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RELEGITIMATION CRISIS: BEYOND THE DULL COMPULSION OF MEDIA-
SATURATED LIFE    NICK COULDRY  
[FINAL DRAFT ARTICLE FOR DIVINATIO  JOURNAL] 
 
There is a long tradition of blaming media for the ills of society. It found expression in the 
reflections of the 1975 'Report on the Governability of Democracies' submitted to the 
Trilateral Commission. The resulting book contained the following quote from one of its 
authors, the French sociologist Michel Crozier: 'Television has . . . made it impossible to 
maintain the cultural fragmentation and hierarchy that was necessary to enforce traditional 
forms of control . . . the more this [media] sounding board emphasizes the emotional appeal 
of the actors’ “life experience”, especially as biased by the technique of the media, the less 
easy it is to force a real analysis of the complex game on which political leadership must 
act'.1  The fear of the authors was not that mass media undermined democracy, but that it 
stimulated too much democracy, as another report author, Samuel Huntington, reflected: 'we 
have come to recognize that there are potentially desirable limits to economic growth. There 
are also potentially desirable limits to the indefinite extension of political democracy.'2  
Echoes  of Plato's banishment of poetry from the ideal state can be found here in these 
decades-old reflections, but the common principle is not the danger of 'beauty', but the role of 
certain media (in ancient Greece, poetry and drama; in the 1970s television) in allowing and 
encouraging expression. Another 1970s pessimist Daniel Bell argued that culture - defined as 
'the arena of expressive symbolism' – generates contradictions within capitalism, 
contradictions between a 'culture of hedonism' and the actual organizational demands of the 
economy.3 Bell's implied reference to popular culture and mass media as a site of individual 
and group expression was clear. Jürgen Habermas' account from the same period of a 
growing legitimation crisis in 'advanced capitalist societies' was far more subtle and indirect, 
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but it too argued that, while the threats to legitimation internal to the political system could 
probably be dealt with by the welfare state and political competition, the key threat to 
legitimation came from a 'motivation crisis' linked to the prolonging of adolescent anxiety 
into later life: once again, without being named as such, mass media's causal role as a site of 
pleasure, sexual freedom and group identity was clearly implied.4  
The direction of Habermas' analysis was however directly opposed to that of the 
Trilateral Commission. Running through Legitimation Crisis is Habermas's debate with 
Niklas Luhmann, and Habermas's rejection of Luhmann's view (that was almost a double of 
Huntington's) that government based on growing participation is incompatible with solving 
the complex system-problems of government (understood as administration) in large 
societies.5 For Habermas, by contrast, it was a fundamental error to reduce 'questions of 
validity' ('claim to truth and correctness') to 'questions of behaviour' or system functioning, 
because in that way the possibility of redeeming the legitimacy of a political system was lost 
for ever.6 Habermas' debate with Luhmann is important for the argument I will make here, 
since Habermas defended the possible link between ethics and social or political 
organization. A similar insistence is focused in the writings of Daniel Dayan that generated 
this conference: a concern that we face a crisis generated by contemporary media's 
incompatibility with effective democracy. My argument, put briefly, is that we cannot grasp, 
or think beyond, what I call today's 'relegitimation crisis' without both an ethics of media and 
a sociology that captures how mediatisation has transformed the everyday realities of all the 
organizational processes (economic, political, administrative) that in the 1970s seemed still 
autonomous from the media sector. (In today's crisis of democracy, incidentally, there is a 
remote double of Luhmann's old position: it is occupied by those who argue, like Mark 
Deuze, that 'media life' – the process of media-saturated identity generation across multiple 
platforms – is now a natural process that supplants any need for ethical or political distance. 
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7Paradoxically, this call to celebrate 'media life' as a second nature claims to be in tune with a 
'new' democratic voice, even as it decouples itself from the only possible basis of democratic 
critique of existing institutions.  
What exactly is the relegitimation crisis I see today? First, let me emphasise, it is not 
the separate and deep legitimation crisis that today surrounds global financial markets and 
national political processes. A further irony, looking back at Habermas' 1970s book, is that 
the two factors he believed secured Western democratic systems from an internal legitimation 
crisis – the welfare state and effective competition between political parties – are both now 
under threat in neoliberal democracies where no effective challenge exists to relentless 
marketization, including of the welfare state. But today's immediate crisis of working 
democracy – the conflict in many countries between the representation of political will in 
democratic process and a very different popular will emerging on the streets – that crisis, 
while played out in media, derives the specific breakdown of financial markets from 2007 
onwards and so cuts across the longer-term difficulties in the relations of media to democracy 
that concern me here.  
That (re)legitimation crisis will continue even after (as we hope) today's deep 
financial and governance problems are resolved. When I write fo 'crisis', I mean this less to 
signal an irretrievable breakdown of society and politics, and more to signal a decision-point 
(the origin of the term 'crisis' in the Greek 'krisis', whose root is 'krinein', to decide or 
discern), a moment when choices need to be made as to the direction in which social and 
political organization are going. It is a crisis derived from the long-term consequences of the 
mediatization  - or, more specifically, the increasing and irrevocable saturation by media - of 
every domain of daily life: both government process and individual self-organizing, both 
corporate time and family time. One of the best investigations of this crisis is Bruce Bimber's 
book Information and American Democracy which shows how the digitalization of 
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information, and the information abundance it generates, change the operating conditions of 
institutional power. Digitalization of information not only increases hugely the information 
resources available to institutional elites; it also transforms the archival access to past 
information and media for all sorts of actors, and facilitates horizontal communication outside 
elites. While this has benefits for institutional organization, a cost is to make institutions more 
vulnerable to the dissemination of information by non-elites, especially via media. As a result 
all institutional authority becomes vulnerable to leaks, sabotage and increased informational 
traffic: new information flows make institutions more porous, their authority more unstable.8 
Other perspectives on the relegitimation crisis come from research on mediatization's 
implications for policy generation and political contestation. Thomas Meyer in his account of 
'media democracy' argues that when media visibility becomes the basic condition of all 
political action, what counts as a political problem (that which requires a policy adjustment) 
becomes defined in large part by whatever is likely to play well as a 'policy adjustment ' in 
media. Pierre Rosanvallon by contrast rejects the idea that we suffer a deficit of democratic 
participation, but insists the real question is what type of democratic participation is 
stimulated by a world of continual political spectacle and scandal: it is a form of 'counter-
democracy' with ever more ways for citizens to express their dissatisfaction with government 
and power, but as yet few ways of expressing a positive political will, or building positive 
programmes for change.9  (Rosanvallon wrote without reference to twitter and the rise of 
political blogs, but they only reinforce his argument.)  
These writers are not concerned with the specific interests of media institutions, but as 
Graeme Turner has recently pointed out, media add a further paradox to the mix. If 
entertainment has become the domain paradigm of global media, as media markets expand 
across the world, then forms of social representation that fit entertainment templates become 
increasingly normal and such formats of social knowledge (such as reality TV formats in 
5 
 
neoliberal democracies are an important example) carry an ideological weight, even if they 
lack ideological intent. This process is amplified by the huge spread of media culture, through 
social media embedded in the very rhythms of everyday life.10  
What I loosely call a relegitimation crisis – for the sake of a convenient title – is not 
(as in the 1970s) a matter of media culture obstructing the still separate and protected 
domains of government and corporate management, but instead the penetration by media 
(media pressures, timescales, incentives, forms) into more and more sectors of both 
government and everyday life. It is a crisis both of system (that is, organizations and 
institutions) and of lifeworld (that is, 'us'). A sign of this double crisis, or decision-point, are 
the emerging calls for ethical reflection by once fervent advocates of the digital: for example, 
Jaron Lanier in his book You Are Not a Gadget  and Sherry Turkle in her book Alone 
Together, both published this year. Turkle asks directly the Socratic question: 'is [technology] 
offering us the lives we want to lead?'11  
Two questions lie at the heart of this gradually emerging relegitimation crisis: first, 
are today's forms of organization (political, bureaucratic, social) compatible with the intense 
mutual glare of mediatization? Second, are our individual lives - with and through media - 
sustainable under the pressure of intensified mutual display that digital media practice brings? 
It is artificial, of course, to separate the organizational domain from the personal (clearly they 
interpenetrate each other). The overlap between the organizational and the personal has 
vividly emerged in the phone hacking crisis within News International Corporation and other 
parts of the UK press, where the conflict between the systemic demands of a 
hypercompetitive scandal-chasing media and even the most basic norms of human interaction 
and respect has become clear. Behind this scandal, however, lies an even more difficult 
question: whether we are yet able to clarify the ethical norms that should apply to the 
circulation of images between individuals in today's media-saturated world?  
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One response to such deep and interpenetrating crises is to say: practice will find the 
solution. Wittgenstein once remarked that 'the sickness of a time' is cured only 'by an 
alteration in mode of life'.12 But if we followed Wittgenstein, we would give up writing, stop 
talking, and go home! My own view is it is the sheer difficulty and overlayered nature of 
today's democratic crises that requires us, as academics, to work to articulate the problems, to 
chart the obstacles to change, and to reimagine the horizons of possibility in society and 
politics, as in the conference that hosted these papers. In the second part of my talk, I want to 
outline the way forward that I envisage: this will combine a critical sociology of media with 
an ethics of media, and it will be that combination that is crucial. 
 
A Way Forward 
The issues already raised are too many to be discussed in detail. So I want in the rest of my 
time to elaborate on two aspects: first, the underlying dynamics affecting how media 
institutions contribute, for good or ill, to the texture of contemporary public life; and second, 
the relationship between a sociological understanding of the conditions of contemporary 
media and society, and an ethical approach to media. Under the second heading, I will not say 
much about the specific principles of media ethics (about which I have written at length 
elsewhere), but will focus instead on explaining how a media ethics is both compatible with, 
and necessary for, a sociology of media. I know that for some sociologists it makes no sense 
to enter into the realm of normative critique, and I admit to finding myself uncomfortable 
when expounding even what I take to be potentially consensual principles of an ethics of 
media. But we have, I believe, no choice. 
 Today, the world of media institutions is subject to many interlocking uncertainties in 
the digital age (uncertainties of platform and bandwidth, economic model and audience) but 
let me concentrate on an uncertainty of key importance for political legitimation: the 
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changing status of media as social and political institutions. Media make representations: they 
re-present worlds (possible, imaginary, desirable, actual). Media make truth claims: the gaps 
and repetitions in media representations, if systematic enough, can distort people's sense of 
what there is to see in the social and political domains. Modernity's key processes of 
centralization (economic, social, political, cultural) themselves have always relied on media 
as infrastructures of communication, as James Beniger's great book The Control Revolution 
brought out for 19th century industrializing societies such as the USA and UK and as replayed 
today in very different circumstances India and China, Iran and Brazil.  
It is the apparently necessary role of media in the social fabric that underlies what I 
have called elsewhere 'the myth of the mediated centre'.13 I say 'apparently' because there are 
always historical alternatives (there is no teleology to history, pace Hegel). 'Centres', still less 
'mediated centres', are not necessary features of social organization: rather, over time, things 
have been progressively organized so that, to borrow a phrase of Pierre Bourdieu, 'everything 
goes on as if' they are necessary. Our very notion of 'the media' is an example:14 out of the 
disparate dynamics of multiple media industries, something has emerged as general and as 
mythical as 'the media'. But what if the changing dynamics of media's production, 
consumption and economics are undermining this myth of the mediated centre? What if the 
very idea of ‘the media’ is imploding, as the interfaces we call 'media' are transformed? The 
disruptive dynamics are not here technological per se: the internet’s distinctive ability to link 
up previously separate contexts (think of YouTube) arguably makes it easier, not harder, to 
sustain ‘the media’ as a common reference-point.  
Disruption instead derives from how technological possibilities are meshed with 
wider economic, social and political forces. Joseph Turow's analysis of the media industry's 
decreasing interest in the general audience identifies a deep economic dynamic of disruption. 
However, if basic consumer demand – for fashion, music, sport – is to be sustained at all, it 
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requires common reference-points towards which we turn to see what's going on, what's cool. 
Indeed media corporations are increasingly looking for the 'water-cooler moment' that will 
drive multiple individual users to follow content across platforms so that income can be 
generated along the way. As Graeme Turner argues, the (relative) decline of mass media is 
not the same as a decline of media's 'centrality'. In the multiple-outlet digital media era, 
'centrality' becomes an even more important claim for media institutions to make, as they 
seek to justify their wider 'value'. The ability to speak for, and link audiences to, a 'mediated 
centre' becomes all the more important, even as its reference-points in social and political 
reality are unsettled.  
Arguments for change in media's underlying social dynamics are equally ambiguous. 
For decades, the word ‘liveness’ has captured our sense that we must switch on centrally 
transmitted media to check ‘what’s going on’. Such social impulses do not suddenly 
disappear. But what if new forms of ‘liveness’ are now emerging that are primarily 
interpersonal? Is there emerging (on social networking sites, through everyday use of 
smartphones) a sense of social ‘liveness’, what Ken Hillis calls a 'distributed social centrality' 
– mediated, yes, but not by central media institutions?15 What if social networking sites 
induce a shift in our sense of what 'news' is – a shift from following public politics to simply 
following social flow - a change as fundamental perhaps as the birth of 'news' itself in the 16th 
and 17th centuries? 
The directions of change are complex. The intensity of feedback loops on social 
networking sites makes them particularly well suited to create a ‘buzz’ around both niche and 
general products, feeding back into mainstream media. Far from focussing an alternative 
'centre', the centring processes of SNS and mainstream media may well become increasingly 
intertwined like the strands of a double helix, in a world where marketing itself strives 
increasingly to be like more 'conversation'. There is little evidence so far that this double 
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helix works to amplify general news consumption. For sure, social media may take on a 
political role under conditions of conflict, as the Arab Spring and subsequent economic 
protests in Europe and North America have illustrated, but those circumstances may be 
precisely exceptional.  
More broadly media's relations to 'the social' are intertwined with the fate of national 
politics, indeed any politics. It is a truism of political science that politics is fundamentally 
mediated. The pictures of politics that media circulate is not 'just another' narrative: it is the 
set of narratives that underwrites contemporary politics' space of appearances.16 Nor have 
states disappeared; indeed their projects of social surveillance and border defence have grown 
more ambitious. Governments must engage intensely with 'the media’s' fate, hence their 
pursuit of new political audiences via social networking sites, prominent first in President 
Obama’s use of social networking sites in 2008. But here the underlying interests of large 
political, and large media, institutions - in sustaining their authority through the construction 
of a mediated centre - converge. The Guardian and BBC for example are happy to act as 
warehouses of protester videos (the Arab spring provided many examples, but an earlier 
example was their coverage of the 1 April 2009 G20 London summit, where fatal police 
attacks on a bystander were captured on mobile phone video). Media corporations' uses of so-
called 'user-generated content' to bolster their own position as leading social storytellers 
repeat, under new conditions, a strategy Barbie Zelizer first noticed in television coverage of 
the assassination of John F Kennedy and its aftermath.17   
If a mediated centre is sustained, it may be at the price of entertainment dislodging 
politics from its core. The dominance of entertainment (a less costly investment than 
investigative journalism) suits the bottom-line economics of weak media institutions, but is 
compatible with many political contexts and outcomes: whether in post-socialist competitive 
nationalism in former Yugoslavia, the socialist/market hybrid politics of China, or the fragile 
10 
 
democratic politics of post-dictatorship Philippines. And sometimes, as in today's Arab world 
or the USA of President George W. Bush, entertainment may be the most effective way for 
voices that challenge traditional and elite discourse to break through. 
What emerges from these reflections is that no institutional domain – no sector of 
society, whether government, corporations, religious bodies, the military or civil society – 
can fail to have an investment in what I call the myth of the mediated centre, and in 
sustaining that centre in some form, even if the contest very often is about what form this 
'centre' takes. And although, within this multidimensional conflict over the direction and 
status of media institutions, there are system dynamics driven by something other than 
political or social intent (for example, media industries' need to sustain their audiences' 
attention as a precondition for selling it), that does not mean we can treat the outcomes of this 
struggle as a pure 'system output', and so beyond the reach of normative critique. On the 
contrary, what is at stake in this conflict are the regularities of how societies are represented 
to themselves, and indeed how something like 'societies' become accessible for public 
reflection and political challenge at all. And so a critical media sociology cannot be neutral 
on whether we have an ethical framework for thinking about media: it precisely needs such a 
framework in the background. Here Habermas' 1970s debate with Luhmann, discussed 
earlier, might be replayed in relation to Luhmann's own late reflections on media in his book 
The Reality of Mass Media,18 which dismissed the idea that media are accessible to normative 
critique.  
In my own work, I have explored the possibility of normative critique of media via 
neo-Aristotelian ethics, outlining three possible virtues of media-related practice for 
professionals and non-professionals alike: those virtues are accuracy, sincerity and care.19 I 
don't want to repeat here my detailed arguments for the relevance of such virtues, not just 
because of lack of time, but also because a wider set of ethical problems concerning all 
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digital communications is now becoming visible that we are much less ready to chart. 
Considering this will lead me into some closing reflections on the relationship between an 
ethics of media and a critical sociology of media. There must, after all, be more than an 
accidental connection.  
There are multiple ways of living with media.20 What values might enable us to start 
sorting out good from bad outcomes? One might be the concept of 'recognition' as developed 
by Axel Honneth. Individuals and groups need to be recognized as moral and social agents. 
This is linked to the fundamental value of 'voice' that I have described elsewhere.21 In 
recognising someone as capable of contributing to the social process, we are recognising, for 
example, her capacity for deliberation about how life should be organised.22 Media play an 
important role in providing such recognition and in sustaining spaces where such capacity 
can be actualized, as Eva Illouz's pioneering work has explored.23 Recognition, in turn, 
requires us each to be allowed some freedom of action within which to fulfil the capabilities 
for which we are recognised: recognition without some practical degree of freedom is empty. 
Yet freedom is impossible except against the background of various degrees of practical and 
ontological security to which media and other institutions, in their stability, contribute.  
Media institutions and outputs help sustain both the immediate and underlying 
conditions of mutual recognition. To sustain mutual recognition, media must be open to 
participation and challenge, worthy of trust as forms of truth-telling, and practised with care. 
Actual media institutions may well not meet these standards. There is little reason to believe 
that media institutions, just because they are free to compete in a market, are ipso facto likely 
to contribute to these broader goods. As the philosopher Bernard Williams argued, the 
market-system, while it may make outright tyranny difficult to sustain, 'does less well in 
sustaining the complex of attitudes and institutions that as a whole stand against tyranny'. 24 
To value media freedom, then, does not mean regarding market freedoms as trumping all 
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other values for organizing media. Media, at bottom, are social institutions. The acute 
difficulties that market forces today pose for any ethical media practice of journalism – of 
which the recent phonehacking scandal in Britain is just an example – require normative 
principles framed beyond a narrow market-focussed notion of freedom.  
We cannot clarify how – individually, collectively, institutionally – we can live well 
together with, and through, media unless we can agree on some extrinsic aims which our 
practices with media should satisfy. Indeed the intense implication of our lives in media, from 
all directions, creates what Paul Ricoeur calls a limit situation that requires us to build a new 
ethical perspective on media. Whatever the broader issues raised by our individual 
implication in digital communication every day (for example, via social media), we dare not 
neglect the distinctive ethical issues that continue to be raised by media institutions and 
media content (such as news), produced professionally for large-scale distribution. The 
practical projects of living well, and living well with media, are inseparably intertwined with 
the theoretical tasks of media ethics and media theory.   
Media play a crucial role in representing the facts and norms that guide our action in 
the world, and, if they do so badly, they can injure the social fabric.  A good life involves, 
among many other things, the existence of media that contribute to our ability to grasp 
accurately the conditions under which we, and others, live. In turn, an adequate debate about 
media ethics requires a clear understanding of what media do in the world, that is, a media 
sociology which analyses how media institutions shape the production and occlusion of 
knowledge, the formation of social power, and strategic claims to social 'reality'. The point, 
for me, of 'media studies' is to study how media contribute to conditions of knowledge and 
agency in the world, and so to our possibilities of living well together.  
Today's relegitimation crisis requires a much more explicit debate than previously 
about the conditions under which 'the mediation of everything' (in Sonia Livingstone 's 
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phrase) affects the stable working of democratic institutions. It also requires a much more 
open debate than has been seen since the early days of broadcasting about who is empowered 
to deliberate and how that contributes to whether the media we have are the media we need. It 
is vital that the process of media regulation is opened up once more to citizen participation 
(just as practised in the early days of French radio),25 and also that working journalists and 
media professionals have their capacity for ethical reflection protected from the constraints 
which operate in most commercial media workplaces.  
Such an expanded circle of debate about the means and ends of media, and their 
consequences for the social and political fabric, must confront openly some very difficult 
questions about the conditions under which an intensely mediated life – both public and 
private – becomes unliveable. Any answers to those questions will cut across market 
imperatives:  so the debate that generates such answers must be as widely grounded in social 
and civic life as possible. In starting this long journey, we return to a problem that Alexis de 
Tocqueville put aside as too difficult when, in Democracy in America, he noted the inevitable 
tendency of media institutions to move from being mere conduits of information to being 
institutions with major social power of their own. In one passage he considered the possibility 
of some restraint being put on such media power, and certainly did not rule it out. To quote 
Tocqueville directly: 'if any one could point out an intermediate, and yet a tenable position, 
between the complete independence [of the press] and the entire subjection of the public 
expression of opinion, I should perhaps be inclined to adopt it; but the difficulty is to discover 
this position'.26 Now perhaps is a good time to attempt once more to discover the position – 
the perspective from which open normative debate about media institutions becomes possible 
– that eluded de Tocqueville. I hope this special issue, and the conference from which it 
derived, will prove to be the start of that search. 
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